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THE LAW GOVERNING AIRPLANE ACCIDENTS
WILLIS L. M. REESE*
This paper owes its genesis to the fertile mind of Professor Frederic
L. Kirgis, the Director of the Francis Lewis Law Center of the
Washington and Lee Law School. He invited the writer to develop some
preliminary ideas on what law should govern airplane accidents with the
understanding that these ideas would be submitted to a group of
knowledgeable persons.' This group would then meet at the Washington
and Lee Law School for an intensive discussion during which, it was
hoped, a consensus of some sort would be reached. Things transpired as
Professor Kirgis desired. The group met during the period of February
4-5, 1982. There was, to be sure, no complete agreement on the part of
anyone, but it seems fair to say that all present were in sympathy with
the general approach suggested and with its underlying rationale. The
following article is a more developed version of the paper discussed in
Lexington. It incorporates many of the ideas advanced at the meeting,
but the responsibility for what is said is that of the writer. Undoubtedly,
each of the consultants would disagree in varying measure with some of
the points that will be made.
Professor Kirgis established one ground rule. This was that it should
not be proposed to have federal law govern the rights and liabilities of
parties involved in airplane accidents in the United States. As a prac-
tical matter, this might well be the best solution. Surely, there would be
no constitutional objection to the development of a federal rule that
would preempt the field. Also, much could be said in favor of having a
uniform rule apply throughout the United States.' Indeed it can be said
with little exaggeration that the current situation is almost intolerable.
Suits involving a single airplane accident are frequently brought in
federal courts sitting in a number of states and then transferred to a
single federal court by the Judicial Panel on Multistate Litigation.'
Under current practice, the transferee court will then be faced in the
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law Emeritus, Columbia University; Reporter,
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. A.B. 1935, LL.B. 1938, Yale University.
The writer wishes to express his thanks to Professors Oliver Lissitzyn and Andreas
Lowenfeld for reading and commenting upon this paper when it was in draft form.
' In addition to Professor Kirgis, these persons were Lee Kreindler, Esq. of the New
York Bar, Professor Andreas Lowenfeld of New York University Law School, and George
Tompkins, Esq. of the New York Bar. Messrs. Kreindler and Tompkins specialize in cases
involving airplane accidents. Professor Lowenfeld is the author of AVIATION LAW (2d ed.
1981).
, See Note, The Case for a Federal Common Law of Aircraft Disaster Litigation, 51
N.Y.U.L. REV. 232 (1976); Kohr v. Allegheny Aitlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
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case of each suit with the unenviable task of applying the choice-of-law
rules of the state in which the suit was originally brought.4 On the other
hand, a choice-of-law solution would have to be adopted in the case of
many accidents that occurred in foreign countries.' This being so, it
might be simpler and more desirable to follow the same path in the case
of United States accidents as well. In any event, Professor Kirgis oc-
cupies a world where he does not feel bound by purely pragmatic con-
siderations. He desired a choice-of-law solution which might prove of in-
terest not only in the field of airplane accidents but also in other areas of
torts. The writer was only too happy to oblige.
The writer's proposals were derived from a number of principles.
First, the suggested formulations should consist of actual rules of choice
of law which would afford some predictability of result and would be
relatively easy for the courts to apply.' If possible, it would be desirable
to avoid such vague criteria as application of the law of the state with
the most significant relationship7 or of the state which has the greatest
interest in the decision of the issue at hand8 or of the state whose in-
terests would be most impaired if its law were not applied.9 Formula-
tions of this sort are hard for the courts to apply and afford little predict-
ability of result except in the clearest of cases.
Most of the modern cases dealing with airplane accidents purport to
apply criteria of this sort. The opinions make for dreary reading, but,
worse still, they do not state the real reasons which led the court to the
particular decision. It seems almost certain that by and large the judges
first decided upon the result they wished to reach and only then thought
of a rationale that would more or less support their conclusions. For ex-
ample, one finds judges saying, in apparent seriousness, that it would be
in the interest of a state to apply its more liberal rule of damages against
' See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Boston, 399 F.Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975).
The proposals that will be made for changes in the current choice-of-law approach to
airplane disasters would not ameliorate this situation unless either (1) the great majority of
the states were to adopt these proposals or (2) the federal courts were to adopt the pro-
posals as a matter of federal law and also hold that federal rather than state choice-of-law
rules should be applied in the case of litigation transferred to a single federal court under
federal law. It could be suggested with some persuasiveness that because of the complex-
ities involved the rule of Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), requiring application of
the choice-of-law rules of the state from which a case has been transferred, should not be ap-
plicable in this instance.
5 This would be true in the case of suits against producers of air frames or other com-
ponent parts of an aircraft. Suits against carriers to recover for injuries suffered in the
course of international flights are today likely to be governed by the Warsaw Convention.
Choice-of-law problems would arise in such cases if the United States were to denounce the
Convention.
6 Cf. Reese, Choice of Laws: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L.Q. 315 (1971).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963).
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a local manufacturer in favor of a nonresident plaintiff who had suffered
injury in an airplane accident in another state.0 The results reached in
the cases may well be desirable, but the written opinions hardly aid in
the development of the law since the reasons they advance are so largely
a sham. It was hoped to suggest formulations that not only are clear and
precise, but would also lead to results that are generally in line with
those that the courts would currently reach.
The settlement process would also be speeded and facilitated by the
existence of choice-of-law rules governing airplane accidents. This is of
significance, since undoubtedly the great majority of cases involving
such accidents are concluded by means of a settlement between the par-
ties. Much time is currently spent in settlement negotiations on choice-
of-law questions because agreement on what is the applicable law must
logically precede discussion of such basic issues as standards of liability
and measure of damages. If some certainty and precision could be
brought to choice of law, attention could be directed more speedily and
more efficiently to the important substantive issues.
The second principle is that the proposed choice-of-law rules should
favor the plaintiff over the defendant. This would be in line with the
results reached in the cases involving airplane accidents. This would also
be in line with what is thought to be the basic policy underlying the law
in the field of personal injuries and, indeed, in most areas of torts. The
trend in recent years has been, increasingly, to favor the tort plaintiff,
except in the areas of defamation and privacy." This, in turn, leads to
the conclusion that the basic policy underlying most areas of torts is to
afford compensation to the plaintiff and thus, by reason of the
prevalence of liability insurance, to spread the risk of loss.
It seems beyond argument that, insofar as possible, the rules in one
field of the law should seek to complement the rules in other areas.
There is, therefore, every reason why choice-of-law rules should be
designed whenever possible to further the basic policy underlying the
substantive field of law to which they apply. This has already been done
in so many areas that it seems necessary to give only a few examples.
The basic policy in the field of contracts is to protect the justified expec-
tations of the parties. This policy is furthered by the choice-of-law rule
that, subject to some exceptions, the parties can choose the law to
govern their contract. 2 It is also furthered by the rule that a contract
will not be invalidated for lack of the requisite formalities if it complies
either with the requirements of the law of the place of contracting or of
that which governs the validity of the contract in general." Likewise,
, See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 745 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
" W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, xi (4th ed. 1971).
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
" Id. § 199.
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there is probably a general tendency on the part of the courts to apply a
law that will uphold the contract. 4
The basic policy in the field of trusts is undoubtedly to protect the
expectations of the settlor. Here we find the courts eager in their choice-
of-law decisions to apply a law that will sustain the trust.'5 The same
policy underlies the law of wills, where statutes which provide that a
will should be held valid with respect to formalities if it complies with
any one of a number of enumerated laws. 6 A Hague Convention on the
subjecf takes a similar approach." Finally, coming closer to our subject,
there is the German rule that in a personal injury action, the law more
favorable to the plaintiff, as between that of the place of injury or of the
defendant's conduct, is the law that should generally be applied. 8 Also, a
Hague Convention on the law governing products liability'9 gives the
plaintiff, in certain circumstances, a limited choice between one of two
laws.
Favoring the plaintiff is not, of course, the only value that should be
considered in formulating rules of choice of law for airplane accidents.
The defendant should be accorded fair treatment and regard should also
be had for the needs of the interstate and international systems. At the
very least, a defendant should not be held subject to a law whose applica-
tion he had no reason to foresee. Likewise, the interests of the interstate
and international systems require that the law of a state should not be
applied in situations where such application would not serve the purpose
of this law or would invade the proper domain of other states."0
Another principle on which the writer proceeded, but which evoked
almost unanimous disagreement from those present at the meeting in
Lexington, is that domicile should play no role in the selection of the law
to determine rights arising from a typical airplane accident in which a
number of persons are either killed or injured. The reason is that, other-
wise, different treatment would be accorded to persons who essentially
are similarly situated." In the writer's opinion, it would be unseemly, for
14 See, e.g., Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882); Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Con-
flict of Laws, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1175 (1959).
11 See, e.g., Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937); Hutchison v.
Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933); Cross v. United States Trust Co., 131 N.Y. 330, 30
N.E.2d 125 (1892).
10 See, e.g., UNIFORM WILLS ACT § 7.
17 Hague Convention on the Conflicts of Laws Relating to the Form of Testamentary
Dispositions, reprinted in 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 705 (1960).
" The German rule is discussed in U. DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 213-16 (2d ed. 1972); Juenger, Lessons Comparison Might Teach, 23 AM. J.
COMp. L. 742 (1975).
19 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, reprinted in 21 Am.
J. COMP. L. 150 (1973).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 (1971); Reese, Legislative Jurisdic-
tion, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1978).
" This would not be the case, of course, if all passengers on the plane had the same
domicile. Such a situation, however, would be unlikely to occur on commercial flights and, as
1306 [Vol. 39:1303
AIRPLANE ACCIDENTS
example, for a passenger to recover either more or less than other
passengers on the same plane by reason of the law of his domicile.
Likewise, differentiating among passengers on the basis of their respec-
tive domiciles would impose a heavy burden on the courts in situations
where the rights of a considerable number of passengers are in issue. It
must be recognized, however, that a number of courts have given great
weight in their choice-of-law decisions to the domicile of the respective
plaintiffs,' and weighty arguments can be advanced for doing so. Almost
invariably the state of a person's domicile has the greatest interest in
him and therefore good reason exists why its law should be applied.'
The case for doing so is probably weaker when standards of liability are
in issue. It might be thought inappropriate, for example, for a manufac-
turer or a carrier to owe some passengers a duty in strict liability and to
owe others on the same plane only a duty in negligence. It might also be
inappropriate for a manufacturer or carrier which has no substantial
contact with a state imposing strict liability to be nevertheless subject
so such liability to one or more passengers by reason of the law of their
respective domiciles. 4 On the other hand, there would be less objection
to having the law of a passenger's domicile determine issues relating to
damages. This is an issue with which the state of a person's domicile will
be particularly concerned. Consequently, there is greater reason to
overlook in this instance the fact that differing treatment will thereby
frequently be accorded to passengers on the same plane, or stated in
other words, to persons who essentially are similarly situated.
Despite these persuasive arguments, the writer remains of the opin-
ion that the law of a person's domicile should be disregarded. Primarily,
this is because of the view that persons who are similarly situated
should, usually at least, receive similar treatment. In part, this is also
because, as already stated, a heavy burden would be imposed upon the
courts if they were required to differentiate among numerous
passengers on the basis of the law of their respective domiciles. Further-
will be indicated, the proposed formulations are concerned only with such flights. See text
accompanying note 29 infra.
' See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 480 F.Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1979); In
re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, 399 F.Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975); Gordon v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 391 F.Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Long v. Pan American World Airways, 16
N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796 (1965); Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
2 Mendelsohn, A Conflict of Laws Approach to the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L.
AND CoM. 624 (1967); Note, Lex Domicilii and the Warsaw Convention, 9 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1118 (1968).
2 To impose strict liability might impinge improperly upon the interests of the state of
incorporation and thus be contrary to the best interests of the interstate and international
systems. Cf. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Kirgis, The Rules of Due Pro-
cess and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94 (1976); Martin, Con-
stitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1976). Recently, however,
the Supreme Court has indicated that there are few constitutional constraints on choice of
law. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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more, wholesale application of the law of a person's domicile would lead
to this law being applied to the disadvantage of producers and carriers
that have had little or no contact with the domiciliary state. Take the
case, for example, of a New Yorker who purchases a ticket in Istanbul
for a flight on Turkish Airlines from Istanbul to Cairo. The plane, which,
we will assume, was manufactured in France, crashes in the course of
the flight. Would it not be objectionable in these circumstances for a
New York court, assuming that suit could be brought in this state, to ap-
ply New York law to the suit against either carrier or producer? Would
not such application of New York law constitute an invasion to other
states and, hence, be contrary to the best interests of the international
system?25 Would not it likewise be contrary to the best interests of the
interstate system for New York law to be applied in a similar situation
involving contacts that are located almost entirely in sister states?
One point on which everyone in Lexington agreed is that no weight
in the selection of the applicable law should be given to the state where a
particular passenger acquired his ticket. This state might lack any
substantial relation to the parties or to the occurrence. Also, in the nor-
mal situation, some passengers on a particular flight would have ac-
quired their tickets in different states. Hence, giving weight to the place
of acquisition in the choice-of-law process would inevitably lead to dif-
ferent treatment of passengers.
A further principle on which the writer based his suggestions is that
choice of the applicable law should depend upon the particular issue.
This is in line with current thinking26 and hence is hardly surprising.
Needless to say, the same law will frequently govern a number of issues,
but it is not to be expected that a single law will necessarily govern all
issues in a case. This poses a problem to one who seeks to construct
rules, since it would be burdensome, and probably impossible, to deal
separately with every issue that could possibly arise. Nothing like this
was attempted here. The suggested rules deal only with a few main
issues. Perhaps these rules could satisfactorily be applied to other issues
as well, but this is not here asserted.
The final, and perhaps the most important, principle on which the
proposed formulations are based is that the plaintiff should be given a
' It may be that application of New York law in this case would be unconstitutional
under due process. See authorities cited in note 24, supra, and Reese, Legislative Jurisdic-
tion, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1978).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS chs. 7 & 8 (1971).
There are, of course, limitations on the extent to which different laws can appropriately
be applied to govern different issues. For example, it might be inappropriate to hold a
defendant strictly liable under the law of state X and subject to punitive damages under the
law of state Y if X did not allow punitive damages because of its rule imposing strict liability.




limited power to choose the applicable law.' This is in line with the prin-
ciple previously discussed that choice-of-law solutions in this area should
favor the plaintiff. To make the court decide which among a number of
specified laws is most favorable to the plaintiff would impose a con-
siderable burden upon it and might also complicate and extend the litiga-
tion. The content of each of the specified laws might have to be brought
to the attention of the court. Also the court's decision as to which is the
most favorable law on a given issue might be the subject of an appeal.
All these difficulties would be avoided by giving the plaintiff the power
of choice. His counsel would have the burden of making the choice of law,
and this decision would not be subject to appeal. The court would be
freed, at least in large part, from the task of determining foreign law and
the litigation process would be expedited. Also, giving plaintiff this
power of choice would not add to his already favored position. The court,
if given the task, would have to determine which law, among a number of
specified choices, is most favorableto the plaintiff. The plaintiff would
be given exactly the same limited choice. The net result, whether the
choice was made by the plaintiff or the court, should be the same.
If the plaintiff is to be given the power of choice, there would be the
question of when in the litigation process the choice should be exercised.
Presumably, this should be at some time after discovery has been com-
pleted. Only then will the plaintiff have had the opportunity to ascertain
all the relevant facts. And only after he has ascertained the facts will he
be in a position to determine which law would favor him the most. Take,
for example, a case where it is unclear at the outset whether the crash of
an airplane results from the negligence of the airplane producer or
whether the latter can be held liable, if at all, only on the basis of strict
liability. In such a situation, the plaintiff would have to wait until the
end of discovery to decide upon the theory of his action against the
manufacturer and, in all probability, on the law of which state would be
most favorable to him.
Giving each plaintiff a power of choice among the laws that will be
suggested should not lead to any serious disparity of treatment among
passengers on the same plane. In almost every case, one of these laws
should prove to be the most favorable on the particular issue to all of the
passengers involved. Each could therefore be expected to make the
same choice. This would not be true, of course, if each plaintiff was given
the option of selecting the law of his domicile.
A plaintiff's power of choice would not, of course, extend to issues of
judicial administration or, as more popularly known, to issues of pro-
" There is some precedent for giving such a choice to a tort plaintiff. See, e.g., Article
6 of II Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, reprinted in 23 AM.
J. Comp. L. 150 (1973); Reese, Products Liability and Choice of Law: The United States Pro-
posals to The Hague Conference, 25 VAND. L. REV. 29 (1972).
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cedure. Such issues would continue to be governed, as they have been in
the past, by the law of the forum.28 Included within this category are
issues relating to the pleadings and to evidence, to the conduct of the
trial as, for example, whether the plaintiff should open and close, to the
relative role of judge and jury, and to whether a jury verdict must be
unanimous or can be by a stated majority.
The proposed forumulations are limited to the liability of producers
of air frames or of other component parts and to the liability of air car-
riers. Likewise, they deal only with commercial flights and thus do not
cover accidents on small aircraft, such as corporate jets.29 The formula-
tions also are not concerned with choice-of-law problems relating to the
liability of those responsible for the issuance of faulty instructions by air
controllers and the like. On the other hand, the formulations are not sub-
ject to geographical limitations. They apply to airplane accidents that
take place anywhere in the world.
The proposed formulations, each supplemented by commentary, are
as follows:
I. PASSENGER V. PRODUCER
As here used, "producer" means the manufacturer of the air frame or of
any other component part of the aircraft.
A. Whether Producer's Conduct Was Liability-Creating
Plaintiff can choose law of:
(1) Place of manufacture or design;
(2) Producer's principal place of business;
(3) Place of departure on trip; or
(4) Place of intended destination.
Comment: Whether the conduct was liability-creating will normally pre-
sent the question of whether the producer can be held strictly liable or
only liable for negligence.
Permitting the plaintiff to choose either the law of the state of
manufacture or design 31 or of the producer's principal place of business
would surely not be unfair to the producer. It could naturally be ex-
pected to comply with all the requirements of these laws and to insure
against any liability it might incur for failure to do so. Also, these states
have a real interest in the producer and in how it conducts its affairs. In
situations where injury was caused by reason of the failure of the pro-
ducer to comply with one of the state's requirements, such as subjecting
2s RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 123-130 (1971).
Different formulations might be appropriate in the case of accidents involving small
aircraft. For example, it might frequently occur in such cases that all of the passengers in-
volved had the same domicile.
The place of design may, of course, be different from that of manufacture.
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a component part to a required inspection, it can be said with good logic
that the interests of the state would be served by the application of its
law to hold the producer liable.3 ' This is not so clear when the question is
whether the producer should be held strictly liable under, say, the law of
the state of manufacture in a situation where, under the law of all other
states having contacts with the case, there would only be liability for
negligence. That the interests of the state of manufacture would be fur-
thered in such a situation by the application of its law seems somewhat
dubious. Nevertheless, application of this law can be justified on the
ground that this would not be unfair to the producer and would be in line
with the tort policy of providing compensation to the injured plaintiff.
On the other hand, it would be unwise to restrict the plaintiffs
choice to either the law of the state of manufacture or design or of the
producer's principal place of business. The plaintiff might have no con-
tact with either of these states and, perhaps of greater significance, the
producer might choose to conduct its activities in states whose law is
favorable to it. What other choice should be given the plaintiff, however,
poses a difficult problem. For reasons stated above, it is thought that the
plaintiff should not be able to choose either the law of the state of his
domicile 31 or of that where he purchased his ticket. 3 What other states
remain? One possibility would be the state where the plaintiff suffered
injury, during the course of the flight. The difficulty, of course, is that
this state might be purely fortuitous and bear no reasonable relation to
either the plaintiff or the producer. This law has accordingly been re-
jected with the realization, however, that better substitutes are not easy
to find. The laws selected, although with some hesitation, are those of
the place of departure and of the intended place of destination.
The place of departure seems an obvious choice. It will necessarily
bear some relationship to the plaintiff since it is the place where he
started his trip.' Also, the producer would have good reason to foresee
that planes of its manufacture would come to this place and hence could
hardly contend that application of the law of this place would be unfair.
There is a problem in the case of a flight with scheduled stops. Suppose,
for example, that a plane starts in state A with an ultimate destination
in state C and a scheduled stop in state B and that the plane crashes
somewhere on its flight from B to C. Should a passenger who boarded
the plane in state A be permitted to choose the law of state B? Perhaps
of greater difficulty, should a passenger who boarded the plane in state
B be permitted to choose the law of state A? It is thought that in both in-
stances the answer should be in the affirmative. Otherwise, passengers
" Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 102
U.S. 252 (1981); In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F.Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975); cf. Halstead v.
United States, 535 F.Supp. 782 (D. Conn.-1982).
" See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
" See text prior to note 26 supra.
Cf. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
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on the same flight would have a different choice of laws with the result
that, in all probability, there would be disparity of treatment for those
who in essence are similarly situated. This is a result that should be
avoided. Also, giving passengers this additional choice would be in line
with the pro-plaintiff bias of the formulations.
The place of intended destination does not provide as obvious a
choice as does that of departure." Of necessity, the plaintiff will have a
substantial relation with this place and there will be good reason for per-
mitting him to choose its law, if the plane crashes there upon arrival. If
the crash occurs somewhere else, however, a particular plaintiffs rela-
tion to the place of his intended destination may be tenuous at best.
Nevertheless, for lack of a better alternative, it is suggested that the
plaintiff should be able to choose to have the law of this place applied.
This place, at the least, will be within the contemplation of the plain-
tiff-something that might not be true of the place of injury if the crash
occurred during the course of the trip. Also, application of the law of the
place of intended destination would not be unfair to the producer since it
would have reason to foresee that planes of its manufacture would come
there in the course of their flights. A problem would be posed by a plane
making several scheduled stops, since some of the passengers could be
expected to have different places of destination. To avoid disparity of
treatment, in such a situation, each passenger should be able to choose
the law of any scheduled stop even though it was not his intended place
of destination.
B. Recovery by Passenger of Compensatory Damages from Producer
The passenger should have the same choice of laws as in the case
where the issue involves standards of liability. Namely, he should be
able to choose the law of the place of manufacture or design, or of the
producer's principal place of business, or of the passenger's place of
departure on the trip, or of the place of his intended destination.
Comment: The choice-of-law formulation suggested above to govern
the producer's standard of liability seems equally appropriate in the case
of compensatory damages. The statements made in the previous com-
ment are generally applicable here, although the state of incorporation
or of the principal place of business may have little interest in subjecting
the producer to a more onerous measure of damages. Persuasive
arguments can be advanced for the proposition that the law of a plain-
tiff's domicile should either have exclusive application on the issue of
compensatory damages or, alternatively, that choice of this law should
be among those available to the plaintiff. 6 Without question, the state of
I Under the Warsaw Convention, a passenger's place of destination is the last destina-
tion mentioned on his ticket. Galli v. Re-al Brazilian International Airlines, 29 Misc. 2d 499,
211 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1961).
1 See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
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domicile will have a real interest in the determination of this issue and,
therefore, a substantial claim for being, at the least, within the scope of
the plaintiffs choice. Nevertheless, the law of the domicile has been re-
jected for the reason that its application would frequently lead to dif-
ferent treatment of passengers on the same plane and thus would
discriminate among persons who, in essence, are similarly situated.
A distinction must here be drawn between the elements or heads of
damages and the measurement or calculation of damages. The former
should be determined by the law selected in accordance with the proposed
formulation and the latter by the law of the forum." Within the first
category fall such questions as whether there can be recovery for pain
and suffering, for grief, and for loss of society and of consortium." Also,
in the first category are the items for which damages may be recovered,
either by named beneficiaries or by the estate, in an action for injuries
that resulted in death 9 Included, likewise, is the extent, if any, to which
recovery will be reduced by payments received on account of the injury
from such collateral sources as insurance, worker's compensation, and
the like. On the other hand, the measurement or calculation of damages
will be done in accordance with the processes of the forum. So forum law
will determine whether damages should be calculated by judge or jury
and the extent to which a jury determination is subject to being over-
turned by the judge.
C. Recovery by Passenger of Punitive Damages from Producer
Plaintiff can choose law of:
(1) Place of manufacture or design; or
(2) Producer's principal place of business.
Comment: The plaintiff should not in this case have as wide a choice
as he has with respect to compensatory damages. The primary purpose
of punitive damages is to punish the defendant rather than to compen-
sate the plaintiff for his injuries. It follows that a defendant should only
be held liable for punitive damages under the law of a state that has a.
substantial interest in regulating his activities and, in particular, in
deterring him from engaging in improper conduct. In the case of the pro-
ducer of an air frame or of any other component part of an airplane, the
two states that clearly meet this requirement are that where the part in
question was either manufactured or designed or that of the producer's
principal place of business. Accordingly, the plaintiff should be given the
It is hardly necessary to cite authority in support of so obvious a proposition. The
distinction between heads of damages and the measurement of damages was explicitly made
by the House of Lords in Chaplin v. Boys, [1969] 3 W.L.R. 322, [1969] 2 ALL E.R. 1085; see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 171 (1971).
See, e.g., Casey v. Manson Constr. and Eng'g Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
See, e.g., Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 377, 213 N.E.2d 796
(1965); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
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choice of seeking punitive damages under the law of either one of these
states. 40 The state where the plane crashed, and where, almost in-
variably, the plaintiff would have suffered injury, could also be said to
have an interest in deterring the manufacture of defective planes. This
state might, however, have no substantial relation to either the producer
or the passenger. For this reason, it is not believed that the plaintiff
should be given the choice of this law.
II. PASSENGER V. CARRIER
A preliminary question is whether the carrier can control which law
governs the passenger's claim for personal injury by means of a choice-
of-law provision in the ticket. Should, for example, effect be given to a
provision in the ticket that the law of the state of the carrier's incorpora-
tion should be applied? There seems little doubt that the ticket would be
considered a contract between carrier and passenger 4 ' and it is true that
choice-of-law provisions in contracts are usually respected.4 2 In this case,
it is believed, however, that the choice-of-law provision would be denied
effect. The ticket would obviously be considered a contract of adhesion,
and on this ground the efficacy of any choice-of-law provision it contained
would be suspect.43 Also, the provision would probably be refused en-
forcement on public policy grounds."
The suggested choice-of-law formulations are as follows:
A. Whether Conduct of Carrier Was Liability-Creating45
1. Where Injury Resulted from Carrier's Failure Properly
to Inspect or Repair the Plane
Plaintiff can choose the law of:
(1) Place where the carrier maintained, inspected or repaired the
airplane;
(2) Carrier's principal place of business;
(3) Place of departure on trip; or
(4) Place of intended destination.
" See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981);
Jackson v. KLM, 459 F.Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Sibley v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 454
F.Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
4' Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
13 Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072
(1953).
" Cf. Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, Comment g (1971).
" The proposed formulations could not, of course, be applied to international travel
falling within the scope of the Warsaw Convention as long as the United States remains a
party to this Convention.
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Comment: The issue here would usually be whether the carrier had
acted negligently. At least in the United States, air carriers are not held
strictly liable for injuries suffered by their passengers.46
The carrier could hardly complain if it were held liable under either
the law of the state where it maintained, inspected or repaired the
airplane or of the state of its principal place of business. The first state is
the one where presumably any negligent act on the part of the carrier
would have occurred and, accordingly, could be said to have a real in-
terest in having its law applied.4" The state of the principal place of
business also has an interest in the carrier and in the application of its
law. The carrier could naturally be expected to insure against liability
under the law of either of these two states.
Limiting the choice to the law of one of the two above mentioned
states would be unwise for the reason, among others, that the passenger
might have no contact with these states. For essentially the same
reasons as those stated in the comment to the rule on the law governing
the producer's liability, the plaintiff should also be able to choose either
the law of the place of his departure on the trip or that of his intended
destination.4 8 There would again be the problem posed by a plane making
one or more scheduled stops on the way to its ultimate destination. As in
the case of the producer, it is believed that in such a situation the plain-
tiff should be able to choose the law of any point of departure or of any
destination.
2. Whether Carrier is Liable for Error in Navigation
Plaintiff can choose the law of:
(1) Carrier's principal place of business;
(2) Place of departure on trip;
(3) Place of intended destination; or
(4) Place of error in navigation.
Comment: The error in navigation can be committed by the pilot or,
less frequently, by a fellow employee, such as a co-pilot or an engineer.
It would make no sense in this situation to permit the plaintiff to
choose the law of the state where the carrier maintained, inspected or
repaired the airplane, since this state might have no relation whatsoever
with the occurrence. For essentially the reasons stated in the preceding
comment, however, the plaintiff should be permitted to choose any one
of the first three laws.
It is believed that in this situation the plaintiff should also be able to
" Something approaching strict liability in result, although not in theory, can
sometimes be obtained by means of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. A. LOWENFELD, AVIA-
TION LAW ch. 7, § 4.32 (2d ed. 1981).
See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
" See authorities cited in notes 34-35 supra.
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choose the law of the place where the error in navigation occurred. Fre-
quently, the error will consist of a violation of what might be called the
"rules of the road." As here used, this term includes all regulations
governing the conduct of the carrier during the course of the flight. In
the United States, this area is controlled almost exclusively by federal
law. The Federal Aviation Administration has set standards for air car-
riers49 that include general flight rules, instrument flight altitudes, stan-
dard instrument approach procedures, special traffic patterns, aircraft
airworthiness standards, and pilot qualification standards." Regulations
covering aspects of international flights have been issued by the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).5 Whether violation of these
rules constitutes evidence of negligence or negligence per se depends in
general upon state law.2 And it seems appropriate that the plaintiff
should be able, if he so desires, to seek recovery under the law of the
state where the error occurred. This state has an obvious interest in
having its law applied in order to deter further conduct of this sort and
this interest will be even greater if, as will usually be the case, the
airplane crash and the resulting injuries took place within its territory.
Giving the plaintiff the choice of the law of the place of error in
navigation will not be of assistance to him in situations where the error
occurs either at the place of departure or of destination. The suggested
formulation already gives the plaintiff the choice of the law of either one
of these two places.
For essentially similar reasons, a passenger who suffers injury at an
airport by reason of the carrier's failure to maintain the appropriate
security should be able to seek recovery against the carrier under any
one of the first three of the above-mentioned laws or under the law of
the state where the airport is situated.
B. Recovery by Passenger of Compensatory Damages from Carrier
When the injury results from the carrier's failure properly to repair
or inspect the plane, the passenger should be able to choose the law of
the place where the carrier maintained, inspected or repaired the
airplane, or of the carrier's principal place of business, or of the place
" The FAA is given such authority by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 49 U.S.C. §§
1301-1552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 25, 61, 93, 95, 97 (1982).
5' These regulations are entitled International Standards and Recommended Prac-
tices. They are commonly referred to as SARPs. A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW ch. 6, § 6.12
(2d ed. 1981).
52 See, e.g., D'Arcy v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas. 18,282 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Gatenby
v. Altoona Av. Corp., 407 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1968); Anderson Av. Sales Co., Inc. v. Perez, 19
Ariz. App. 422, 508 P.2d 87 (1973).
Article 12 of the Chicago Convention of 1944 (Convention on International Civil Avia-




from which the passenger departed on the trip, or of his intended
destination. When the injury results from an error in navigation, the
passenger should have the choice of the last three of these laws and also
of the law of the place where the error occurred.
Comment: The statements in the comment to the formulations on
the carrier's standard of liability are generally applicable here, although
the state of incorporation or of the principal place of business may have
little interest in subjecting the carrier to a more onerous measure of
damages. The state of the passenger's domicile has an obvious interest
in the extent to which he can recover damages and therefore a good
claim for having its law included within the scope of the passenger's
choice. This law has been rejected, however, for the reason that its ap-
plication would frequently lead to different treatment of passengers on
the same. plane. Also, application of the law of the passenger's domicile
might be unfair to the carrier in situations where the carrier had little or
no contact with that state.0
As in the case where recovery of damages against a producer is in-
volved, a distinction should be drawn between the elements or heads of
damages and the measurement or calculation of damages. Issues falling
within the first category are determined by the law selected in accor-
dance with the above formulation while those belonging to the second
category are governed by the law of the forum. The statements in the
comment on the recovery of damages against a producer are generally
applicable here. 4
C. Recovery by Passenger of Punitive Damages Against Carrier
Plaintiff can choose the law of:
(1) Carrier's principal place of business;
(2) Place where the carrier maintained, repaired or inspected
the airplane in situations where the injury resulted from
carrier's failure properly to inspect or repair the plane; or
(3) Place of error in navigation in situations where the injury
resulted from such error.
Comment: Punitive damages are intended to punish the defendant
rather than to compensate the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff should
be allowed to choose only the law of a state that has a substantial in-
terest in deterring the carrier from engagink in improper conduct. The
state of the carrier's principal place of business will always have such an
interest. And so, too, will the state where the carrier maintained, in-
spected or repaired the airplane in situations when the injury resulted
from a defect in the plane." When, on the other hand, the injury resulted
from an error in navigation, it is thought that the plaintiff should be able
See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
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to seek punitive damages under either the law of the state of the
carrier's principal place of business or of the state where the error oc-
curred. In this situation, the latter state has a substantial interest in
having its law applied.
5 6
III. CARRIER V. PRODUCER
We are concerned here with situations where the parties are not in a
contractual relationship. If they are in such a relationship, their mutual
rights and obligations would be determined by the law governing their
contract." This paper deals only with actions in tort.
Issues covered by the formulation set forth below involve the right
of the carrier to recover from the producer for damage to the plane. The
carrier's right to be indemnified by the producer against liability for in-
juries suffered by a passenger on account of a defect in the plane would
presumably be governed by the law under which the carrier had been
held liable to the passenger.
A. Was Producer's Conduct Liability-Creating?
The carrier can choose law of:
(1) Place of manufacture or design;
(2) Producer's principal place of business; or
(3) Place where the carrier acquired the plane provided that
the producer had reason to foresee that the particular plane,
or a similar plane of its own manufacture, would reach that
state through commercial channels.
Comment: This formulation gives a carrier approximately the same
protection accorded a passenger. Perhaps it goes too far, since the car-
rier can be expected to be in a stronger economic position than the
passenger and is more likely to be protected by insurance. On the other
hand, the producer is in a stronger position than the carrier. Also, a
basic premise of this paper is that a tort plaintiff should usually be
favored over the defendant. On balance, it seemed unwise to draw a
sharp distinction between the rights of passengers and carriers as
against the producer.
As in the case of a passenger, the producer could hardly complain of
being held liable to the carrgier under either of the first two laws. It could
be expected to comply with the requirements of these laws and to insure
against the liability that they impose. Also, the two states involved are
the ones that are most concerned with how the producer conducts its af-
fairs and with holding it subject to their law. 8
11 Jackson v. KLM, 459 F.Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Sibley v. KLM-Royal Dutch
Airlines, 454 F.Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 8 (1971).
See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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On the other hand, as in the case of a passenger, there are good
reasons why the carrier should not be restricted to a choice of one of the
first two laws. The producer might choose to conduct its activities in
states whose laws are favorable to it. Likewise, situations can be imagined
where the carrier would have little or no contact with either of these
states. On the other hand, ihe carrier would have a substantial relation-
ship with both of the last two states. Also, imposing liability upon the
producer under either one of their laws could hardly be considered un-
fair where, as is required in the formulation, the producer had reason to
foresee that the plane, or a similar plane of its own manufacture, would
reach the state for lease or sale through commercial channels.59 A pro-
ducer probably has reason to foresee that a plane of its manufacture may
be taken to any place in the world. A far stricter standard of
foreseeability is here required.
A possible addition to the list, or a substitute for one of the laws in-
cluded, would be the law of the place of the accident. This place might,
however, be entirely fortuitous and bear little relation to the parties.
Giving the carrier the choice of one of four laws is, in any event, thought
to be enough.
B. Recovery by Carrier of Compensatory Damages from Producer
The carrier can choose any one of the four laws listed above with
respect to standards of liability. As is also true when the rights of a
passenger are involved, the same choice of law approach seems equally
appropriate for both standards of liability and compensatory damages.
C. Recovery by Carrier of Punitive Damages from Producer
The carrier can choose the law of:
(1) Place of manufacture or design; or
(2) Producer's principal place of business.
Comment: The same formulation has been employed with respect to
the recovery of punitive damages by a passenger from the producer."
Since such damages are designed to punish the defendant rather than to
compensate the plaintiff, the carrier's choice should be limited to the law
of the two states that have a substantial interest in deterring the pro-
ducer from manufacturing or assembling a defective product.
IV. THIRD PERSON V. PRODUCER
This category covers actions brought by persons who were neither
passengers on the plane nor the carrier that operated the plane. The
59 A similar requirement of foreseeability is imposed by Article 7 of the Hague Con-
vention on the Law Governing Products Liability, reprinted in 21 AM. J. CoMP. L. 150
(1973).
" See text accompanying note 40 supra.
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"third person" may be one who suffers injury on the ground, or in
another plane or the carrier operating the other plane.
A. Whether Producer's Conduct Was Liability-Creating
The plaintiff can choose the law of:
(1) Place of manufacture or design;
(2) Producer's principal place of business; or
(3) Place of injury.
Comment: The reasons for giving the plaintiff the choice of either
one of the first two laws have been stated in the comments on the rights
against the producer of a passenger on the allegedly defective plane6'
and of the carrier operating that plane.2 Also, for the reasons stated in
these comments, it would be unwise to limit the plaintiffs choice to one
of these two laws. For lack of a better alternative, the law of the place of
injury has been added to the list. This place may be essentially for-
tuitous so far as the producer is concerned. But it is the only place that is
certain to have a contact with both the producer and the plaintiff. Also,
in the case of an injury suffered on the ground, the place of injury will
usually have a close contact with the plaintiff.
B. Recovery by Third Party of Compensatory Damages from Producer
The plaintiff can choose any one of the three laws listed above with
respect to standards of liability. As is also true in the case of the other
situations dealt with in this paper, the same choice-of-law approach
seems appropriate for both standards of liability and compensatory
damages .
63
C. Recovery by Third Party of Punitive Damages from Producer
The plaintiff can choose the law of:
(1) Place of manufacture or design; or
(2) Producer's principal place of business.
Comment: The same formulation has been employed with respect to
the recovery of punitive damages by either a passenger64 or a carrier
from the producer." These two states have the most substantial interest
in deterring the producer from manufacturing or assembling a defective
product.
The state where the third party suffers on the ground has a substan-
tial interest in providing the plaintiff with adequate compensation for
61 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
See text accompanying 47 supra.
See text prior to notes 36 & 54 supra.
See text accompanying note 40 supra.
See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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his injuries. On the other hand, that state may have only a slight or for-
tuitous contact with the producer. It is not believed that this state has a
sufficient interest to warrant application of its law solely for the purpose
of punishing the producer. It is also questioned whether it is desirable to
give the plaintiff the choice of seeking punitive damages under the law
of more than two states.
V. THIRD PERSON V. CARRIER
This category covers actions brought by persons who were not
passengers on the plane operated by the defendant carrier. The "third
person" may be one who suffered injury on the ground or in another
plane or the carrier operating the other plane.
A. Whether Conduct of Carrier Was Liability-Creating
1. Where Injury Resulted from Carrier's Failure
to Inspect or Repair Plane
Plaintiff can choose the law of:
(1) Carrier's principal place of business;
(2) Place where the carrier maintained, inspected or repaired
the airplane; or
(3) Place of injury.
Comment: The reasons for giving the plaintiff the choice of either
one of the first two laws have been stated in the comment on the rights
of a passenger against the carrier on whose plane he was riding.6 Also
for the reasons stated in that comment, it would be unwise to limit the
plaintiffs choice to one of these two laws. For lack of a better alter-
native, the law of the place of injury has been added to the list. This
state is certain to have a contact with both the defendant carrier and the
plaintiff. Also, in the case of an injury suffered on the ground, the place
of injury will usually have a close contact with the plaintiff.
2. Whether Carrier Is Liable on Account of Error in Navigation
Plaintiff can choose the law of:
(1) Carrier's principal place of business;
(2) Place of error in navigation; or
(3) Place of injury.
Comment: It would make no sense in this situation to permit the
plaintiff to choose the law of the state where the carrier maintained, in-
spected or repaired the airplane, since this state might have no relation
whatsoever with the occurrence. The reasons for permitting the plaintiff
to choose the law of one of the three abovementioned states hardly need
6 See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
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mention. The interest of the first two states, and the fairness of applying
their law, are apparent. The place of injury is certain to have a contact
with both the defendant and the plaintiff.
B. Recovery by Third Party of Compensatory Damages
from the Carrier
The plaintiff should have the same choice of laws as in the case
where the issue is whether the carrier's conduct was liability-creating.
Comment: In this, as in the other situations dealt with in this paper,
the same choice-of-law approach seems equally appropriate for both
standards of liability and compensatory damages. 7
C. Recovery by Third Party of Punitive Damages from the Carrier
Plaintiff can choose the law of:
(1) Carrier's principal place of business;
(2) Place where the carrier maintained, repaired or inspected
the airplane in situations where the injury resulted from a
failure properly to repair or inspect the plane; or
(3) Place of error in navigation in situations where the injury
resulted from such error.
Comment: In the case of punitive damages, the plaintiff should only
be able to choose the law of a state that would have a substantial in-
terest in punishing the defendant for its behavior. The state of the car-
rier's principal place of business will always have such an interest. What
other state has the required interest depends upon whether the injury
resulted from a failure properly to repair or inspect the plane or from an
error in navigation. In the first instance, such interest is possessed by
the state where the carrier maintained, repaired or inspected the plane.
In the case of an error in navigation, the second state of interest is that
where the error occurred.
CONCLUSION
A virtue of this paper may be the approach employed. The attempt
has been made to suggest rules of choice of law which, if adopted, should
serve to ease the judicial task of deciding cases and to provide some cer-
tainty and predictability of result. Such rules should also do much to
counteract the current tendency of the courts to write opinions which
are opaque in their reasoning and frequently fail to state the actual
reasons for the results reached. The suggested rules favor the plaintiff.
This is in line with the notion that choice-of-law rules should, when possi-
ble, further the basic policies underlying the substantive field involved.
" See text prior to notes 36 & 53 and text accompanying note 63 supra.
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In the field of airplane accidents, the basic policy is believed to be that,
whenever reasonable, compensation should be granted the plaintiff for
his injuries and the risk of loss shifted to those best able to bear it. The
rules permit the plaintiff to rely upon the law of any one of a number of
designated states. This is perhaps a rather novel concept which is
designed to further the goal of favoring the plaintiff, to shorten the
litigation process, and to relieve the court of the task of choosing the'ap-
propriate law. It is thought that application of the suggested rules would
lead to results that are generally the same as those that would be reached
by the use of current techniques.
It is hoped that the approach here suggested is worthy of considera-
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